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Abstract
Background: In the early stages of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, border control measures were taken by quarantine stations to
block the entry of infected individuals into Japan and community containment measures were implemented to prevent the
spreading. The objectives of this study were to describe these measures and the characteristics of infected individuals, and
to assess the measures’ effectiveness.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Border control and community containment measures implemented from April to June
(Period I: April 28–May 21, Period II: May 22–June 18) 2009 were described. Number of individuals identified and disease
characteristics were analyzed. For entry screening, a health declaration form and an infrared thermoscanner were used to
detect symptomatic passengers. Passengers indicated for the rapid influenza test underwent the test followed by RT-PCR.
Patients positive for H1N1 were isolated, and close contacts were quarantined. Entry cards were handed out to all
asymptomatic passengers informing them about how to contact a health center in case they developed symptoms. Nine
individuals were identified by entry screening and 1 during quarantine to have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Health monitoring
by health centers was performed in period I for passengers arriving from affected countries and in period II for those who
had come into contact with the individuals identified by entry screening. Health monitoring identified 3 infected individuals
among 129,546 in Period I and 5 among 746 in Period II. Enhanced surveillance, which included mandatory reporting of
details of the infected individuals, identified 812 individuals, 141 (18%) of whom had a history of international travel.
Twenty-four of these 141 passengers picked up by enhanced surveillance had been developing symptoms on entry and
were missed at screening.
Conclusion/Significance: Symptomatic passengers were detected by the various entry screening measures put in place.
Enhanced surveillance provided data for the improvement of public health measures in future pandemics.
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Introduction
Once a novel influenza strain emerges in a country, international
travel from that country can present a risk for infection in other
countries [1,2]. As the pathogenicity and infectivity of new strain
are unclear in the early stages of emergence, proactive public health
measures are required to block the entry of infected individuals
from abroad and delay the spread of infection in communities [3,4].
In the case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 an influenza strain that
emerged in Mexico and the U.S. in 2009 [5–8], many countries
implemented border control measures for travelers from affected
countries upon their arrival [9,10]. These border control measures
have been effective, especially for island countries, because it was
practicable to block the entry at critical points–at airports and
harbors–and, once in the country, to keep track of the whereabouts
of individual passengers who entered from affected countries
[11,12].
Japan was among the countries that implemented border control
measures for international travelers, in accordance with the
‘‘Guidelines forthe Preventionand Controlof Pandemic Influenza’’
[13] proposed by a governmental committee in February 2009.
After the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic
alert phase 4, all quarantine stations in Japan, in accordance with
the Guidelines and the Quarantine Act, performed entry screening
as part of border control measures. As Cowling et al. pointed out
in their review of entry screening policies adopted by different
nations during the pandemic, individuals were identified by various
methods according to the measures each nation put in place [10].
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in airplane cabins and quarantine of individuals who had come into
close contact with infected individuals, details of their assessment
remain unclear.
As the incubation period for the influenza virus is reported to be
2 days on average (range: 1–4 days) [14,15], it is difficult to identify
infected individuals during the incubation period through border
control measures alone. Blocking the entry of all infected
individuals from other countries is almost impossible to achieve
and therefore it is necessary to conduct health monitoring, which
traces individuals who may possibly develop symptoms after entry
into the country. Another important measure to prevent the
infection spreading in communities is enhanced surveillance,
which includes proactive examinations to identify patients and
mandatory reporting of patient information [16].
To establish optimal measures for the future, it is necessary to
clarify what border control measures and community containment
measures were implemented in Japan during the early stages in the
outbreak of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and how effective they were. At
present, there isonly a brief description inJapaneseofsuchmeasures
[17], and an assessment of the measures has not yet been made.
Therefore, in this study, we analyzed in detail the border control
and community containment measures that were put into effect
and the characteristics of individuals identified by the respective
measures during the early stages in the outbreak of Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009. Especially important to clarify were the following:
(1) the methods used to identify individuals through the respective
measures implemented, the numbers and characteristics of the
individuals screened, and the standards for the indication for the
influenza diagnosis test; (2) the information that was obtained, at
critical points of entry, for arriving passengers; and (3) the
definition of ‘‘close contact with infected individuals’’ in relation to
individuals for whom this was deemed to apply. In addition, we
reviewed those cases where individuals already infected at entry
were missed by the screening process put in place. We undertook
the above with the aims of assessing these measures and suggesting
how to better manage pandemics in the future.
Results
The flow for identifying patients by border control measures
and community containment measures during Periods I and II are
shown in Figure 1. Details of these measures are described below.
The numbers of infected individuals identified by each measure
are given in Figure 1.
Details of border control measures
Entry screening. During entry screening, passengers arriving
from other countries had their surface body temperature taken
with an infrared thermoscanner (e.g., TVS-500EX, NEC Avio
Figure 1. Flow of each measure to identify infected individuals in Japan during the period April 28–June 18 and the number of
individuals infected with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with international travel histories within 7 days of onset (n=151). Note: n is the
number of individuals identified with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by each measure: 10 for Border Control Measures at Narita International Airport (4 from
entry screening and 1 from quarantine in period I, 5 from entry screening in period II); 141 for Community Containment Measures (3 from health
monitoring in period I, 5 from health monitoring and 133 from mandatory reporting in period II). The 24 missed cases are not shown as it is not
known whether they were identified by health monitoring or enhanced surveillance. *Affected countries: Mexico, mainland U.S., Canada. **MHLW:
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.g001
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officers in both Periods I and II. In airplane cabins, a handheld
infrared thermoscanner was pointed at stationary passengers and
crew members. Inside the airport terminal building, a fixed in-
frared thermoscanner was pointed at passengers walking past.
Instead of asking passengers to remove any glasses they were
wearing which could potentially influence the results, the infrared
thermoscanner was targeted carefully on their face by quarantine
officers. Mexico, the mainland U.S., and Canada were classified
as ‘‘affected countries’’. Quarantine officers collected the self-
reporting health declaration forms that had been handed out in
the airplane cabin to all the passengers arriving on planes from
these countries and in the airport terminal to passengers arriving
on planes from other countries. The form contained items on the
presence or absence of any symptoms, history of contact with
infected individuals, and the places they planned to visit in Japan
during the first 10 days after entry. An entry card was then given
to all arriving passengers instructing them to consult with staff at
public health centers if they developed symptoms while in Japan.
The card also certified completion of entry screening. In Period I,
Japanese quarantine officers boarded direct flights arriving from
the affected countries. In Period II, when the quarantine station
received information from the airlines that symptomatic individual
was onboard a flight, entry screening was performed in the
airplane cabin before disembarkation. Moreover, if any individuals
had declared influenza-like symptoms on the health declaration
forms collected, doctors would examine the individuals to assess
whether they were indicated for the rapid influenza diagnostic test,
which could distinguish influenza types A and B: this test was
carried out in the airplane cabin in Period I and in a health
consultation room at the airport’s quarantine station in Period II.
The standards for the indication for the rapid influenza diagnostic
test have been established as follows: passengers with travel history
to the affected countries who have 2 or more of 4 symptoms (1.
nasal discharge or nasal obstruction, 2. sore throat, 3. cough, and
4. fever, or feeling feverish and chills) or passengers with body
temperature .38uC (directly measured by tympanic or axillary
temperature) [13]. At entry screening, all individuals who
underwent the rapid influenza diagnostic test were reported to
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). Those
individuals who did not meet the standards for the indication for
testing were not reported to MHLW and also did not undergo
testing during entry screening. If the results of the rapid influenza
diagnostic test were positive for type A, individuals suspected of
having Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 were transferred to designated
medical institutions for isolation. If they were identified as having
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by the RT-PCR test, they were treated
and isolated at these institutions until no excretion of the virus was
confirmed. In addition to the 200 staff or so at Narita Airport
Quarantine Station who were involved in implementing these
measures, staff from other airports, ports, the Self-Defense Force,
and national hospitals were also involved.
Quarantine. Quarantine was a measure taken in Period
I for travelers who had been in close contact with a sympto-
matic individual identified on entry screening to be infected with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. According to the Guidelines for the
Prevention and Control of Pandemic Influenza [13], close contact
was defined as a person (passenger) seated within a radius of 2 m
(up to 3 seats away in all directions) from a symptomatic individual
with suspect infection and who had traveled the same course
as the symptomatic individual. If a symptomatic individual was
identified by the RT-PCR test to be infected with Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, those who had come into close contact with him or
her were quarantined at designated hotels near the airport. The
asymptomatic individuals were placed under medical observation
in separate rooms at the hotel. Prophylactic medication with an
anti-influenza virus was offered during the quarantine period. The
quarantine period was set as that of the incubation period of
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: from April 28, the period of quarantine
was a maximum of 10 days, which was shortened to a maximum
of 7 days from May 15 onwards. When an individual developed
influenza-like symptoms during quarantine and the infection was
confirmed by the RT-PCR test, the individual was isolated in a
designated medical institution.
Infected individuals identified by border control
measures
Table 1 summarizes the data on the number of individuals who
underwent entry screening, individuals who were indicated for the
rapid influenza diagnostic test at entry screening, positive cases,
and individuals identified by the RT-PCR test in Periods I and II
from among all passengers arriving on direct flights from affected
counties. In Period I, 6 individuals were found to be influenza
type-A positive; 4 were confirmed as being infected with Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 by the RT-PCR test and the remaining 2 were
determined to have seasonal influenza (H1 and H3, respectively).
In Period II, 10 individuals were found to be influenza type-A
positive; 5 were confirmed to have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 3 had
H3, and the remaining 2 had seasonal influenza.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of 10 cases identified as
having Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 during entry screening at Narita
International Airport, including one individual who was a fellow
traveler with the first 3 infected individuals confirmed in Japan
and who developed symptoms during the quarantine on the day
after arrival. These 3 cases detected for the first time in Japan were
from the same party of travelers (1 teacher and 2 students on a
school trip) arriving on May 8 from Canada. They had all already
developed symptoms 2 days previously. On May 25, an American
father and his 5-year-old son, both of whom were residents of
Japan, returned from the mainland U.S. The son had developed
symptoms 4 days before arriving in Japan and had been diagnosed
with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 before departure. The father also
developed symptoms on the day before arrival. Two of the 9 cases
detected at entry screening had developed fever .38uC. During
Period I, 49 individuals (including the 1 individual who developed
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 mentioned above) were quarantined
because of having come into close contact with the first 3 infected
individuals detected on May 8. Of those 49 individuals, 36 were
fellow travelers in the same school-trip party. The seats on the
airplane of 13 of these individuals were within 3 seats away from
each other in all directions.
Details of community containment measures
Health monitoring. Health monitoring by public health
centers was performed for all passengers arriving from the affected
countries during Period I. In Period II, health monitoring was
performed mainly for fellow travelers of infected individuals
identified during entry screening. Information on individual
passengers based on the health declaration forms collected by
quarantine officers was provided by the Quarantine Station to 510
public health centers as of April 2009 for passengers that would
stay in their area. Health monitoring was performed for 10 days
from April 28 to May 14 and for 7 days from May 15 to June 18.
Staff at the public health centers monitored the health of identified
individuals by telephone and gave instructions for body tem-
perature to be measured twice a day, in the morning and evening.
When any symptoms developed, the individual was asked to report
immediately to a public health center. If influenza-like symptoms
Border Control and Community Containment Measures
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arranged a consultation with a doctor in a fever clinic. Fever clinics
were special clinics established by prefectural and city gover-
nments where patients with pandemic influenza and those they
have been in contact with could be assessed, in order to minimize
influenza transmission in the community and in other healthcare
facilities. At these clinics, infection with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
was confirmed by the RT-PCR test and individuals were then
isolated at a medical institution until no excretion of the virus was
confirmed.
Enhanced surveillance. Enhanced surveillance was per-
formed in the community. When patients were identified by the
RT-PCR test during Periods I and II, medical institutions man-
datorily reported these to the national authorities via public health
centers. On May 11, 2009, through a TV commercial and the
internet, the Prime Minister asked for the people’s cooperation,
that if an individual living in Japan developed influenza-like sy-
mptoms, he or she would consult a public health center. When
public health center staff suspected infection, they contacted a
doctor to arrange an examination at a fever clinic. In the fever
clinic, the rapid influenza diagnostic test was performed, and when
type A was detected, it was followed by the RT-PCR test. The
following items were to be reported mandatorily: date of onset,
symptoms, place of infection, personal characteristics, and date of
confirmation of infection with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by the RT-
PCR test. If an individual had a history of international travel
within several days before onset, optional information such as the
date of arrival and symptoms at entry were also reported. In the
Table 1. Among passengers arriving on direct flights from affected countries, number of individuals who underwent entry
screening*, number indicated for the rapid influenza diagnostic test, number of positive cases, and number of individuals
identified with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by RT-PCR tests at Narita Airport Quarantine Station.
Individuals undergoing entry
screening among arriving
passengers on direct flights
from affected countries (n)
Individuals
indicated for
rapid influenza
diagnostic
test** (n)
Individuals found to
be influenza type-A
positive by rapid
influenza diagnostic
tests (n)
Individuals
identified with
Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 by RT-PCR
test (n)
Individuals identified with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
among those indicated for
rapid influenza diagnostic
test (%)
Period I (in the cabin)
28 April–7 May 81,941 287 2 0 0.0
8–14 May 63,188 171 3 3 1.8
15–21 May 60,908 103 1 1 1.0
Total 206,037 561 6 4 0.7
Period II (at the quarantine station in the airport terminal)
22–28 May 61,525 95 4 3 3.2
29 May–4 June 63,757 65 1 0 0.0
5–11 June 66,871 44 4 2 4.5
12–18 June 73,543 40 1 0 0.0
Total 265,696 244 10 5 2.0
*Including transit passengers.
**Passengers with travel history to the affected countries who have $2 of 4 symptoms (1. nasal discharge or nasal obstruction, 2. sore throat, 3. cough, and 4. fever, or
feeling feverish and chills) or have hyperthermia .38uC (directly measured by the tympanic or axillary temperature).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.t001
Table 2. Characteristics of individuals identified with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by border control measures.
Case Arrival date Onset date Sex Age group Nationality
Affected
country visited Fellow travelers
Body temperature upon
entry screening (6C)
1 8 May 6 May M 40–49 y Japanese Canada Cases 1–4: traveling together 38.5
2 8 May 6 May M 10–19 y Japanese Canada 36.6
3 8 May 5 May M 10–19 y Japanese Canada 37.1
4 8 May 9 May M 10–19 y Japanese Canada During quarantine Afebrile
5 21 May 18 May M 20–29 y Korean Mainland U.S. None 38.4
6 24 May 23 May M 40–49 y Japanese Mainland U.S. None 37.1
7 25 May 24 May M 30–39 y American Mainland U.S. Cases 7 and 8: family traveling
together
37.2
8 25 May 21 May M 5 yrs American Mainland U.S. 36.6
9 9 June 8 June F 10–19 y Japanese Canada Cases 9 and 10: traveling
together
36.9
10 9 June 8 June F 10–19 y Japanese Canada 36.8
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.t002
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sures against the spreading of infection were implemented. These
included school closures, cancellation of group activities, and
administration of prophylactic medication with an anti-influenza
virus agent.
Infected individuals identified by community
containment measures
During the 24-days period when health monitoring was being
performed for arriving passengers from affected countries in
Period I, 117,553 individuals were reported by the Narita Airport
Quarantine Station to the public health centers. The total number
of individuals including those from other airports across the
country was 129,546 according to data compiled by MHLW.
Among them, 3 individuals developed symptoms during health
monitoring and were confirmed to have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
by the RT-PCR test. For the individuals indicated for health
monitoring during Period II (mainly fellow travelers), 5 of 746
individuals were confirmed to be infected across the whole
country. It was reported that 19 individuals did not make contact
with a public health center in Period II; the number in Period I is
unknown.
There were 812 individuals who developed symptoms between
April 28 and June 18 and whose infection with Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 was confirmed by the RT-PCR test in accordance with the
community containment measures. During this period, those who
were instructed to consult a fever clinic and those who underwent
rapid influenza diagnostics tests under these community contain-
ment measures are unknown. Among those 812 individuals, 141
(18.4%) had a history of international travel within 7 days before
symptom onset. The demographic profiles of these 141 patients
are shown in Table 3. Among these, 68 (48.2%) had visited the
mainland U.S., 37 (26.2%) had visited Hawaii, and 23 (16.3%)
had visited the Philippines.
Twenty-four of the 141 individuals had symptoms upon arrival.
Table 4 shows the characteristics of these 24 individuals reported
in community containment measures, who were not identified
at entry screening despite having at least one of the four named
symptoms on arrival. There were 16 and 8 individuals with onset
on the day of arrival and on previous days, respectively. The
results of the rapid influenza diagnostic test during entry screen-
ing showed 5 individuals were negative for infection. Twelve
individuals had fever .38uC at entry screening, 2 of whom had
visited the Philippines and were suspected of having Dengue fever.
They were tested for Dengue fever but not for Pandemic (H1N1)
2009. Although 3 individuals stated they were asymptomatic on
their health declaration forms (Cases 6, 13, and 15), case 13 was
detected by the infrared thermoscanner to have high fever.
Table 5 shows the number of individuals infected with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with or without have a history of inter-
national travel, stratified by weeks. Those without such history
peaked at 276 during the week of May 15 to 21, decreased the
following week, before increasing again thereafter.
Discussion
We have described in detail the border control and community
containment measures implemented for identifying individuals with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and preventing the spread of infection in
the early stages of disease outbreak in Japan, and then assessed the
effectiveness of the respective measures based on the data compiled.
The data on border control measures used in this study were
obtained from the largest international airport in Japan, which
accounts for 95% of flights from the affected countries; the data on
community containment measures were from reports made to the
national authorities by public health centers in accordance with
Japan’s reporting system for infectious diseases.
We found that among the 471,733 passengers arriving in Japan
from affected countries during Periods I and II, 9 infected in-
dividuals were picked up by entry screening and 1 was detected
during quarantine. As many as 141 individuals who might have
been infected during their international travel within 7 days before
onset were identified in Japan as the result of the community
containment measures. Consequently, 6.6% (10/151) of the in-
dividuals infected during international travel were identified by the
border control measures. To our knowledge, although there are few
Table 3. Demographic profiles of individuals identified with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with travel histories confirmed by
community containment measures (n=141).
Patients (n) %
Sex
Male 65 46.1
Female 76 53.9
Age group (years)
0–9 29 20.6
10–19 24 17.0
20–29 38 27.0
30–39 28 19.9
40–49 9 6.4
50–59 9 6.4
$60 4 2.8
Country visited within 7 days of developing symptoms
Mainland U.S. 68 48.2
Hawaii 37 26.2
Philippines 23 16.3
Canada 5 3.5
Australia 4 2.8
Hong Kong 1 0.7
China 1 0.7
Brazil 1 0.7
Thailand 1 0.7
Days from arrival to onset*
24 2 1.4
23 3 2.1
22 2 1.4
21 4 2.8
03 2 ( 1 3
**)2 2 . 7
13 6 2 5 . 5
22 4 1 7 . 0
32 5 1 7 . 7
4 8 5.7
5 4 2.8
6 1 0.7
*Days from arrival to onset is expressed as 0 for the day of arrival, as minus
number of days for previous days, and as plus number of days for following
days.
**Number of symptomatic individuals upon entry.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.t003
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enhanced surveillance afterwards (n=24).
Case Age Sex
Arrival
date
Onset
date
Days from
arrival to
onset*
Affected
country
visited
Body
temperature
at entry
screening (6C)
Contents of health
declaration form
completed on arrival
Rapid influenza
diagnostic test at
entry screening
Symptoms on
arrival revealed by
enhanced
surveillance
1 17 F May 19 May 19 0 USA** 37.8 Negative Cough, sore throat,
nasal obstruction
2 17 F May 19 May 19 0 USA 39.2 Negative Sore throat
3 21 F May 29 May 29 0 USA 38.8 Negative Cough
4 26 F May 31 May 31 0 Canada Cough N/A Cough
5 36 M Jun 2 Jun 2 0 USA 37.2 Cough, nasal discharge,
antipyretic
N/A Cough
6 29 F Jun 4 Jun 4 0 USA No symptoms N/A Cough
7 32 F Jun 6 Jun 6 0 USA Nasal discharge N/A Nasal discharge
8 15 M Jun 6 Jun 6 0 Philippines 40 N/A
9 48 F Jun 7 Jun 6 21 USA Unknown N/A Sore throat
10 33 M Jun 12 Jun 11 21 Hawaii 37- Unknown N/A Cough, sore throat
11 15 F Jun 13 Jun 13 0 Australia 38 Unknown N/A
12 27 M Jun 14 Jun 13 21 Hawaii Unknown N/A Cough, nasal
discharge, nausea
13 41 M Jun 14 Jun 14 0 Philippines 39 No symptom N/A
14 29 F Jun 14 Jun 14 0 USA 37.3 Unknown Negative
15 44 M Jun 16 Jun 16 0 Philippines No symptom N/A Cough
16 14 M Jun 16 Jun 12 24 USA Unknown N/A Cough, sore throat
17 44 M Jun 16 Jun 16 0 Philippines 38.7 Cough, nasal discharge N/A Cough, nasal discharge
18 62 M Jun 16 Jun 14 22 Philippines 38 Cough N/A Cough
19 31 F Jun 16 Jun 16 0 USA 38 Unknown N/A Sore throat
20 37 F Jun 16 Jun 16 0 USA 38 Unknown N/A
21 38 F Jun 16 Jun 16 0 USA .38 Unknown Negative
22 3 F Jun 17 Jun 16 21 USA 38.5 Unknown N/A
23 25 F Jun 17 Jun 14 23 Hawaii 38.5 Cough N/A Cough
24 28 F Jun 18 Jun 15 23 Hawaii Unknown N/A +
Notes: Cases 11 and 13 were detected with an infrared thermoscanner.
Case 8 and 13, Dengue fever was suspected and a test for Dengue was performed.
Case 22 had been negative on a rapid influenza diagnostic test performed in the U.S.
*Days from arrival to onset are expressed as 0 for the day of arrival, as minus number of days for previous days, and as plus number of days for following days.
**USA refers to mainland U.S.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.t004
Table 5. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009-infected individuals with or without history of international travel within 7 days before onset.
With history of international travel (n=151) Without history of international travel (n=671)
n% n%
Period I
28 April–7 May 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0)
8–14 May 1 (1.7) 59 (98.3)
15–21 May 5 (1.8) 276 (98.2)
Period II
22–28 May 8 (23.5) 26 (76.5)
29 May–4 June 16 (40.0) 24 (60.0)
5–11 June 38 (20.8) 145 (79.2)
12–18 June 80 (36.4) 140 (63.6)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031289.t005
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other countries, there is an example of strict implementation that
was undertaken in China [19]. They strictly enforced body
temperature measurement for all passengers arriving from countries
at risk. If passengers had fever .37.5uC or one respiratory
symptom, they underwent the RT-PCR test. These measures
identified 140 of326 passengerswith a historyofinternationaltravel
upon entry in May and June 2009 [19]. Such strict measures are
likely not practicable in Japan because of the human resources
required to implement such measures. As mentioned earlier,
different countries implemented their own border control measures
[9,10]. Because approximately half of the individuals identified in
Japan were arriving passengers from the affected countries, it was
significant that a large number of these individuals were effectively
detected merely by specifying they had been in an affected country.
However, 2 individuals among those identified later in Japan to be
infected had been missed at entry despite being symptomatic. This
wasbecause they had visited thePhilippines, not an affected country
and therefore Dengue fever was suspected.
Aside from these 2 missed individuals, 22 others were identified
after entry into Japan despite being symptomatic at entry screen-
ing. Five of them who met the standards of indication for the rapid
influenza diagnostic test at entry screening underwent the test
and the results were negative. According to a Field Epidemiology
Training Program investigation in the National Institute of In-
fectious Diseases in Japan, the sensitivity of the rapid influenza
diagnostic test for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was 53.5% [20]. It was
reported that the chance of obtaining a negative result was high
when the test samples were taken in the early stages after onset
[20]. The date of onset these 5 cases were on the day of arrival
when indeed these individuals were in the early stages of infection.
Moreover, 3 of these 24 individuals, despite already having
symptoms, did not report their symptoms on the health de-
claration form. One case was detected with an infrared ther-
moscanner and had an actual axillary body temperature of 39uC.
Although there are reports that using infrared thermoscanners
might be impractical due to the low detection rate of cases with
fever [21,22], it is a convenient, cost effective, and quick way to
screen large groups of people for fever, with the ultimate purpose
of identifying fever-related disease of public health significance
[23,24]. In this study, an individual with fever was in fact detected
using the infrared thermoscanner although not declaring it on
the health declaration form; therefore, it may prove efficient both
to check the health declaration forms and use the infrared ther-
moscanner in order to detect symptomatic individuals. Aho et al.
suggested that many of those infected with pandemic (H1N1)
2009 may have been asymptomatic [25]. Therefore, missing asy-
mptomatic cases may be one of causes of infection spreading.
Although the infectivity of asymptomatic cases has not been con-
firmed [26,27], it may be worthwhile to try to detect cases with
fever by using the infrared thermoscanner and the self-reporting
health declaration form.
Entry screening in the airplane cabin was adopted as one of the
methods for entry screening in Japan, and may have been an
effective means of detecting those who had come into close contact
with infected individuals (fellow travelers and passengers seated
within a radius of 2 m). Identifying fellow travelers is important
because, in the present study, infection was detected among some
individuals traveling together. Foxwell [28] reported that seats
within 2 rows from an infected passenger in an airplane cabin
would be in the high-risk range. Furthermore, if an infected
individual was onboard for a long flight, the possibility of infection
would be small but significant [29]. For possible future outbreaks
of pandemic influenza, entry screening in the cabin would enable
us to acquire information on passengers located in this high-risk
zone. However, it must be noted that of the 206,037 individuals
who underwent entry screening in the cabin during Period I in
the present study, which required immense human resources to
undertake, only 4 were identified as being infected individuals.
Trained health staff are finite resources and their deployment to
border control and health monitoring efforts reduces the number
available for other aspects of pandemic management. This is
an important consideration particularly during low prevalence si-
tuations. Because entry screening in the cabin for all flights is costly
in terms of both money and human resources, in Period II it was
limited to only those flights when a symptomatic individual was
suspected. According to the Japanese Quarantine Act of 1951 and
International Health Regulations of 2005, one of the pilot-in
command’s duties when a symptomatic individual is found in the
cabin before arrival is to report the fact to the quarantine station.
If a system in which the pilot could act properly was established,
entry screening in the cabin could be carried out for high-risk
flights and the human resources required would not be large.
Furthermore, if a symptomatic individual in the cabin was re-
ported, the quarantine station could provide instructions to the
pilot to order the individual to wear a mask in the cabin and, if
possible, sit in a more isolated seat (more than 2 m distant from
others) to reduce the risk of spreading by droplet infection [30–33].
According to a survey by WHO of 16 countries [9], 56% (9/16)
reported that entry screening might have delayed the entry of
the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus into their countries, whereas 7
other countries reported that there was no evidence of such effect.
Although there are a number of limitations to entry screening
methods, the diverse measures of entry screening adopted in Japan
might have been effective. Moreover, one individual in the present
study who had been diagnosed with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus
in the U.S. entered Japan. The need for exit screening, undertaken
through international cooperation, should also be considered.
Quarantine aims at the prevention of spreading infection when
possibly infected individuals develop symptoms after entering to
country. Those in quarantine were offered prophylactic medication
with an anti-influenza virus agent. Although the actual number
who took the prophylactic medication is unknown, this measure
might have reduced the risk of onset of the disease. However, the
quarantine system of keeping an individual in a confining facility
(e.g., a hotel room or a quarantine unit) has been discussed as a
violation of human rights [34]. Reynolds et al. reported that there is
a risk that quarantine could cause posttraumatic stress disorder
[35].We should consider new methods of quarantine, such as that
implemented in Singapore during the SARS outbreak where people
were quarantined in their homes [36].
In Japan, entry cards were handed out to all arriving passengers
instructing them to consult a public health center if they develop
symptoms. Therefore, the public health centers were known as
offices in charge of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and were relatively
easy places for people to access. As more than 90% of the in-
dividuals with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 developed symptoms within
3 days after entry into Japan, it is better to state more clearly on
the card that the passengers from at-risk countries should avoid
going out at for least 3 days and contact public health centers
promptly should symptoms develop.
Health monitoring was expected to contribute to the early
detection of cases. At community public health centers, in Period
II the staff obtained information from arriving passengers from
affected countries by directly calling them. However, although this
health monitoring measures was performed across Japan for
all 129,546 arriving passengers from the affected countries, only
3 individuals were identified as being infected with Pandemic
Border Control and Community Containment Measures
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e31289(H1N1) 2009 during Period I, and there is no evidence indicating
the effectiveness of this measures in this Period. In Period II, on
the other hand, health monitoring was done mainly for fellow
travelers, because they had a high risk of infection, which reduced
the number of individuals contacted to 746. Of these, Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 infection was identified in 5 (0.67%), indicating that
reducing the number of individuals in Period II was a practical
and efficient measure.
Enhanced surveillance was performed to obtain information on
the prevalence of infection for proactive epidemiological research,
and to help prevent the spread of infection in communities, based
on the reports of those individuals identified with the infection. A
total of 812 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases were reported through
the notification system for infectious diseases and surveillance
of infected individuals established in Japan. Furthermore, data
on 24 symptomatic individuals not identified upon entry were
collected by enhanced surveillance. Conducting such surveillance
will enable epidemiological information from Japan to be
compared with that from other countries. Such data will also be
useful in the assessment of current measures and in establishing
new measures for the future.
The first patients of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak in
Japan, during the week of May 15 to 21, were high-school students
who had no history of international travel [37]. The containment
strategy measures of infection imposed in the area included school
closure and cancellation of group activities. From May 18 to 21,
180,000 schools were closed [38]. Through careful implementa-
tion of these measures, there was a temporary decrease in the
number of infected individuals detected in the community [39,40],
a tendency that corresponded with the decrease in new domestic
cases across Japan, as detected in this study. These findings suggest
that during periods when domestic infection is limited to specific
areas, enforcing community containment measures in these
affected communities is required. However, the percentage of in-
fected individuals with a history of international travel increased
during the period from May 22 to June 4. It is also important to
block the entry of infected individuals from overseas to help
prevent the infection from spreading.
There are several limitations in this study concerning data col-
lection. In regard to the border control measures, it is not known
how many symptomatic individuals were detected on airplanes
before arrival. As such, it is impossible to compare the effectiveness
of entry screening carried out in the airplane cabin between Periods
I and II. As for the community containment measures, there were
no data available for the number of attempts made to contact each
traveler before they were considered not contactable or the number
of travelers who were instructed to go to a health centre and
received a rapid diagnostic test. Such quantitative data might be
useful for the planning of future public health measures.
The study finding reveal that the border control measures
implemented in Japan were effective to a certain degree, because
as many as 10 infected individuals were identified using the
combined method of a self-reporting health declaration form and
an infrared thermoscanner. We believe that each control measure
by itself has limitations, and that using several approaches will
be more effective. As 18% of the infected individuals identified
in Japan had traveled internationally within 7 days before entry,
even more active intervention for arriving passengers will be
necessary. To implement the current border control measures
more effectively, we suggest that it is practical to implement entry
screening in the airplane cabin on only those airplanes with
symptomatic individuals onboard. For this measure to be im-
plemented, the numbers of passengers to be investigated would
need to be investigated to determine what would be feasible
practically. In addition, we believe it is important to use the entry
cards to explain clearly how arriving passengers should spend the
first 3 days after entry, to help prevent the spread of infection.
Enhanced surveillance will provide the data important for the
improvement of public health measures.
Materials and Methods
We stated by describing the methods practically adopted in
accordance with the contents of a report from the Narita Airport
Quarantine Station [41] and notification and implementation
guidelines from national authorities, which divided border control
measures into entry screening and quarantine, and community
containment measures into health monitoring and enhanced
surveillance. As the implementation guidelines were revised and
measures were changed depending on the spread of the infection
in Japan, we described the methods of implementing the measures
in detail according to two period: Period I, from April 28 (when
WHO declared a pandemic alert phase 4) to May 21; and Period
II, from May 22 (when implementation guidelines were revised)
to June 18 (when Quarantine officers stopped collecting health
declaration forms in accordance with further revision of im-
plementation guidelines).
Regarding entry screening in border control measures, we
described the methods used to identify patients in the airplane
cabin and the standards for the indication for a diagnostic test.
Regarding quarantine, we described the definition of individuals
who had come into close contact with infected individuals and the
quarantine method adopted.
For border control measures, data were collected from reports
prepared by the Narita Airport Quarantine Station at Narita
International Airport, and specifically the number of individuals
who underwent entry screening, the number of individuals who had
the rapid influenza diagnostic test and RT-PCR test to identify
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, the number of positive cases detected, the
characteristics of individuals diagnosed with Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 (e.g., date of arrival, date of onset, sex, age, nationality,
countriesvisited, existenceoffellowtravelers, and body temperature
at entry screening). For community containment measures, we
described how, and for what individuals, public health centers
performed health monitoring. In enhanced surveillance, we de-
scribed how an infection of an individual was identified and man-
datorily reported. Data on community containment measures were
obtained from MHLW. The data were originally reported by
medical institutions to national authorities via public health centers.
These data included the total number of individuals identified as
beinginfected with Pandemic (H1N1)2009 as revealedby RT-PCR
test results, the characteristics of the infected individuals with a
history of international travel within 7 days before onset (sex, age,
countries visited, and days from arrival to onset), the characteristics
of already infected individuals who were not detected by entry
screening and whose infection with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was
identified later in Japan by surveillance (sex, age, date of arrival,
date of onset, days from arrival to onset, countries visited, body
temperature at entry screening, contents of the health declaration
form, with or without a rapid influenza diagnostic test on arrival,
and symptoms on arrival).
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